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Despite the clear relevance of Simon's ideas to the study of animal behavior, few have appreciated his contribution (but see Callebaut 2007) . The role of the environment has been appropriately credited as an important force shaping animal behavior via the concept of adaptive specialization. For instance, comparative analysis indicates that a species' foraging ecology likely molds how it deals with risk and temporal delays in decision making (Heilbronner et al. 2008; Rosati et al. 2007 ). The cognitive capacities of organisms, however, have not been properly considered by models of animal behavior, and this is where Fawcett et al.'s notion of the behavioral gambit is useful.
Unlike many economists studying human behavior, optimization modelers studying animal behavior accepted early on that animals were not optimizing. For instance, in the field of foraging theory, modelers began searching for simple rules of thumb (such as giving-up time rules) that animals could be using to approach optimal outcomes (Stephens and Krebs 1986) . But beyond developing simpler rules that avoid the need for sophisticated computations, little work in animal behavior has actively integrated psychological mechanisms into evolutionary accounts of behavior.
Fawcett et al. nicely highlight the behavioral flexibility that learning offers animals. Expressly modeling the mechanisms of learning and how they influence behavior is underappreciated and critical for understanding the evolution of behavior. However, learning is not the only means to achieve flexibility. Conditional decision rules also produce behavioral flexibility, and they also require an understanding of the cognitive building blocks that must be in place for an organism to implement the rule.
The cognitive building blocks approach suggests that decision rules are composed of multiple cognitive capacities needed to process information. As an example, consider the cooperative strategy tit-for-tat. This relatively straightforward strategy simply copies its opponent's single last behavior in a cooperative interaction. Though tit-for-tat and its variants have been used extensively to model reciprocal cooperation (e.g., Nowak 2006), rarely do researchers consider the cognitive building blocks needed to implement it. Yet, tit-for-tat requires that individual wait for future rewards, remember past encounters, and perhaps quantify costs and benefits and imitate partner actions (Stevens et al. 2005) . Unfortunately, animals (including humans) have a difficult time waiting for future rewards and remembering specific past events, potentially limiting the use of tit-for-tat and its variants. Experiments on blue jays indicate that they only cooperate in an iterated prisoner's dilemma when they play against a tit-for-tat strategist and the experimenter reduces the jay's impulsivity (Stephens et al. 2002) . Further, an experimental test of human memory in an iterated prisoner's dilemma situation demonstrates that even humans have a difficult time tracking the past behavior of partners (Stevens et al. 2011 ). Thus, psychological data force us to rethink the kinds of strategies that organisms actually use in cooperative situations.
The thrust of the behavioral gambit and cognitive building blocks approaches is that we need to fundamentally change how we model behavior. Optimality and game theory have generated an enormous amount of interesting research. But we cannot stop there. To better understand how humans and other animals behave, we must take Simon's concept of bounded rationality seriously and integrate cognitive capacities with the structure of the environment when constructing models of behavior. The behavioral gambit has proven too risky.
We can study how mechanisms evolve without knowing the rules of chess or the workings of the brain We made two main points in our article on the "behavioral gambit" (Fawcett et al. forthcoming, 2012) . We argued not that the gambit should be jettisoned forthwith but that behavioral ecologists should recognize when they are using it and why it may sometimes fail, rather than accepting it blindly. Our second point was that by shifting our focus to the psychological mechanisms governing behavioral flexibility, we can gain important insights and generate interesting new predictions about how behavior changes as individuals gain feedback about the consequences of their actions. We are delighted that our article has attracted comment from 3 leading researchers with an active interest in the adaptive mechanisms controlling behavior. Stevens (forthcoming, 2012) highlights the seminal work by Herbert Simon and argues that decision rules are limited by an organism's cognitive capacities, the "building blocks" used to implement the rules. Although this is undoubtedly true, it leaves open the question of how and why those particular building blocks arose. This is where evolution comes in. Despite acknowledging a role for evolution, very little of the work on heuristics and rules of thumb explicitly addresses their evolutionary properties. Behavioral ecologists certainly have much to learn from those studying bounded rationality, but equally, an evolutionary approach is needed to understand how, when, and why rationality is bounded. Somewhere in between these two disciplines lies fertile ground (Hutchinson and Gigerenzer 2005) . Lotem (forthcoming, 2012) , though broadly in favor of studying the evolution of learning mechanisms, is skeptical that we will make significant progress until we start addressing exactly how decisions are forged in the neurobiology of the brain. Unlike him, we believe that investigating the properties of adaptive learning rules is still useful without a full knowledge of the neurobiological details. Lotem's analogy of parallel parking in fact illustrates our point beautifully, if we consider driving behavior more generally. An alien student studying driving behavior on North American roads could make a good approximation of the decision rules employed by human drivers simply by observing their behavioral interactions with the environment: for instance, employ {drive forward, turn left when safe, or turn right when safe} at {green light}; {slow or speed up and hope you make it} at {yellow light}; {stop or get a ticket} at {red light}; {yield} at {yield sign}. Looking for the rules underlying these behaviors doesn't require knowing anything about the constraints imposed by the kind of vehicle being driven (be it a Porsche, a Toyota, or even a bike), how it was built, how much it cost, or current consumer habits. Here, the behavioral gambit works: we treat the underlying mechanics as nonconstraining and focus on the evolution of driving behavior itself. When the driver is parallel parking, however, the behavioral gambit does not work. Identifying that the gambit is in play lets us identify when it has failed and when the underlying mechanisms need to be taken into account, requiring us to examine the evolutionary origins of the constraints that lead to apparently irrational behavior.
Lotem asks whether we can avoid the gambit "without going all the way to a complete model of the brain." Our answer is yes because the limitations of the behavioral gambit do not necessarily imply the failure of the other simplifying assumptions on which it is built. We maintain that it is possible to obtain useful insights about the generalized properties of learning rules, the circumstances under which flexible behavior is favored, and the reasons why certain cognitive biases exist without having a complete understanding of the neural workings of the brain and the molecular genetics regulating its development. Recent articles addressing the evolutionary properties of learning and decision rules (Duarte et al. 2012; Giske et al. unpublished data; McNamara et al. 2012; Trimmer et al. 2012) clearly show that significant progress can be made by integrating functional and mechanistic studies of behavior.
Houston (forthcoming, 2012) mentions some key developments in the study of learning and optimality. He also takes issue with our borrowing of chess terminology [which followed Grafen's {1984} original usage] . He points out that a gambit in chess can only be shown to be flawed if the opponent first accepts it. In our view, this is analogous to how progress is made in science. Acceptance of the behavioral gambit has enabled us to identify cases where the gambit is unsound, with evolved psychological biases sometimes causing animals to behave in an apparently irrational way. Of course, as with all metaphors, this one has its limits. As Huxley pointed out, the natural world is vastly more complex than chess: "The life, the fortune, and the happiness of every one of us […] depend upon our knowing something of the rules of a game infinitely more difficult and complicated than chess.
[…] The chess-board is the world, the pieces are the phenomena of the universe, the rules of the game are what we call the laws of Nature." (Huxley 1868) Reproductive success does not require that organisms know the laws of Nature, but the mechanisms that have evolved under those laws can produce behavior that performs well on average in a highly complex and unpredictable world. We urge researchers to focus their efforts on studying that evolutionary process. The word "gambit" derives from the Italian gambetto, which means tripping up the heels. Our concern is that by ignoring the mechanistic underpinnings of behavior, behavioral ecologists risk stumbling in their search for adaptive explanations.
